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Abstract
Though the recent literature offers intuitively appealing bases for, and
evidence of, a linkage among religious beliefs, religious participation and
economic outcomes, evidence on a relationship between religion and trust is
mixed. By allowing for an attendance effect, disaggregating Protestant
denominations, and using a more extensive data set, probit models of the
General Social Survey (GSS), 1975 through 2000, show that black
Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics, trust
others less than individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular
denomination. For conservative denominations the effect of religion is through
affiliation, not attendance. In contrast, liberal Protestants trust others more
and this effect is reinforced by attendance. The impact of religion on
moderate Protestants is only through attendance, as frequency of attendance
increases trust of others while the denomination effect is insignificant.
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Introduction
Until recently, economists have tended to either minimize or
ignore altogether the potential impact of cultural factors on economic
efficiency and performance. Within the past few years, however, there
has been a renewed interest among economists regarding social trust
and religion and their effect on individual attitudes and economic
outcomes. Guiso et al., (2003) discuss the problem of causality
possibility working in both directions in studies of cultural factors and
economic outcomes. Their claim is that religion practices evolve only
over very long time horizons and therefore can be treated as time
invariant over an individual's lifetime. In cross-country studies (Guiso
et al. 2003, 2006), they then postulate a link between culture, in
which they include religious groups, and economic outcomes. Their
hypothesis is that culture impacts economic preferences (such as labor
market participation, trust, thriftiness, and fertility) and, in turn,
economic outcomes. Likewise Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006) invoke
Weber's argument that religious beliefs matter for important economic
behavior such as honesty and trust in affecting economic performance.
In a similar manner, Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) focus on
international economic policy issues and argue that religious affiliation
has an important impact on an individual's view of others and
therefore impacts attitudes toward trade and immigration policy, while
Torgler (2006a) finds that religiosity correlates positively with tax
compliance and (2006b) positively with trust in international
organizations such as the United Nations. The common theme is that
religious beliefs shape attitudes (such as trust) which, in turn, impact
economic performance.
Although these authors make an intuitively appealing basis for a
linkage between religious beliefs, participation, and economic
outcomes, a significant relationship between religion and trust is mixed
at best. In another cross-country study, Smidt (1999) finds not only a
statistically significant lower level of social trust in the United States
than in Canada (based on means comparison), but also a positive
correlation between trust and church attendance even while controlling
for denomination. Additionally, he finds that, again based on a
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comparison of mean values, black Protestants and Evangelical
Protestants in the United States are generally less trusting than other
denominations while mainline are Protestants more trusting.
There are few studies, however, on what exactly might add to or
reduce social trust. Putnam's (2000) sweeping survey of the American
social landscape is one important exception. Putnam's hypothesis is
that there has been a decline in social trust over time because of
waning voluntary participation in civic, social, and religious networks.
Putnam also observes that it has been the newer evangelical religious
denominations that have experienced growth and that these
denominations tend to focus community efforts inward rather than
outward. He concludes that (p. 79) “trends in religious life reinforce
rather than counterbalance the ominous plunge in social
connectedness in the secular community.” Further, as Arrow (2000)
and Putnam (2000) point out, and Glaeser et al. (1996) demonstrate
in their study of social interactions and crime, there can be a “dark
side” to social capital, as social interactions can have negative effects
as well as positive. For example, social capital may reinforce
stratification among groups in society.
Recently, economists and sociologists have been interested in
the various determinants of social trust. The most recent studies of the
determinants of social trust in the United States include Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002) and Welch et al. (2004) who specifically investigate the
role of religion. Alesina and La Ferrara use 20 years of General Social
Survey (GSS) data, including among other factors, dummy variables
for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religions. Regarding the
religion controls, they find that (p. 220), “interestingly, these variables
are totally insignificant.” Welch et al. (2004) focus specifically on the
link between religion and individual trust. They employ a single year
(2000) of National Election Study (NES) data to examine the link
between an individual's religious affiliation and attendance and their
trust. They conclude (p. 336) that “contrary to many social
commentators and democratic theorists,” conservative Protestant
beliefs do not reduce social trust (relative to individuals who do not
claim a religious affiliation) and attendance does not correlate with
social trust.
In this paper we also focus on the relationship between religious
traditions, religious participation, and social trust in the United States.
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In particular we hypothesize that religious participation generates trust
of others, and that religious tradition or affiliation impacts an
individual's trust of others, but that there are differential effects on
individual trust across denominations. Our claim is that fundamentalist
denominations are thick-tie networks (along the lines of Granovetter
(1983)) that generate strong in-group trust (or bonding social capital
as in Putnam (2000)) at the expense of others outside of the
fundamentalist enclave. In other words, there is greater trust of those
within the individual's religious network but lower trust of others in
society in general. Liberal Protestant denominations, in contrast, are
weak-tie networks that generate relatively more outward trust (or
bridging social capital). That is, there is a greater emphasis on the role
of the individual in society as a whole in these networks and,
therefore, a greater level of trust of others in society in general than
that of conservative denominations. Hence, participation and religious
affiliation may exert reinforcing or offsetting effects on an individual's
general or overall level of trust. In this application, “social trust” is the
generalized trust of “others” in society. We are unable and do not test
interpersonal trust or trust of others within specific networks, an
extension that also deserves greater attention.
For comparison purposes, our study is designed to compare and
contrast with Alesina and La Ferrara and with Welch et al. There are,
however, some important differences. Contrasting with Alesina and La
Ferrara, we extend the GSS data from 1994 to 2000, disaggregate
Protestant into various logical groupings suggested by the literature,
and include a measure of participation (attendance). We differ from
Welch et al., by using the GSS data covering several years as opposed
to a single year centered on a national election and its potential
anomalies. In addition to the time dimension, the larger sample gives
us an additional advantage in that our estimates of average effects of
specific grouping of Protestant denominations are based on much
larger samples.1 In contrast to both studies, we also investigate the
time aspect of the data set.
The General Social Survey (GSS), 1975 through 2000, is used
to empirically examine the propositions given above. The dependent
variable of analysis is a standard question on the degree of trust of
others in general. Based on probit models, our results show that black
Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics,
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trust others less than those individuals who do not claim a preference
for a particular religious denomination. For these denominations, the
dominant effect of religion is through affiliation as there is only weak
evidence of an attendance effect. In contrast, liberal Protestants trust
others more and this effect is reinforced by attendance. The impact of
religion on moderate Protestants is through attendance, as frequency
of attendance increases trust of others while the denomination effect is
insignificant. A time-trend is significant and negative, confirming the
observations of Putnam and others that trust has been declining over
time. The interaction of the time-trend with religious denominations
and with religious attendance, however, is not significant. Hence,
although membership in various denominations has changed over
time, the contribution of various denominations and attendance does
not appear to have.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second
section offers a brief narrative of the theories on the determinants of
social trust and provides hypotheses on how religion likely affects trust
of others. The third section describes the data and empirical model.
The fourth section provides and interprets the empirical results, while
the final section offers a conclusion.

Social Trust: Why Might Religion Matter?
Theories on the determinants of social trust typically focus on
either individual demographics and experiences, or the cultural and
societal environment in which the individual resides. These two
approaches are typically referred to as Individual Theory and Societal
Theory. (See Delhey and Newton (2003) for a concise yet
comprehensive survey of theories of the determinants of social trust.)
Individual theories of trust postulate that successful and happy
individuals are more trusting. In regard to economic success, the
notion is that individuals in a tenuous economic situation have more to
lose if their trust in someone else is violated. In other words, trust is a
much riskier proposition to the poor. The marginal risk of placing trust
in another to the successful and secure, however, is much lower. This
view is consistent with Putnam's (2000: 138) observation that in
virtually all societies the “haves” are more trusting than the “havenots.” In addition, those who have been treated better by others tend
to be more trusting. In general, therefore, individuals with lower levels
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of education, lower socioeconomic status, minorities, and those who
have experienced divorce or separation are less likely to trust others.
According to societal theories, the second broad category of
trust theories, individuals develop trust attitudes when interacting with
other individuals in society, and likewise affect other individuals'
attitudes. There are three non-mutually exclusive theories under the
umbrella of societal theory. Voluntary Association Theory maintains
that direct interaction with others on a sustained basis in voluntary
organizations (such as a religion-based organization) builds social trust
and, therefore, societies with dense and well-formed formal voluntary
networks will generate relatively higher levels of social trust. Social
Networks Theory, in contrast, claims that although direct interaction is
still important, it is casual and impromptu interactions, such as
chatting with a neighbor in line at the grocery, with neighbors you
encounter at the local pub, or ad hoc contacts in informal networks, for
example at work, that are vital. Another branch of Societal Theory,
Community Theory, places importance on the characteristics of society
itself. According to this approach, individuals who live in societies with
higher levels of income equality and greater ethnic and racial
homogeneity are more trusting. As Delhey and Newton stress, none of
these theories are mutually exclusive and their measurement
indicators often overlap. Empirical models, therefore, at the same time
may find support for many or all of these theories.

Relating and Testing the Social Theories of Trust and
Religion
Participation in a religion is the predominant form of voluntary
association in the United States and, therefore, one might expect, a
priori, that religious participation would be positive and significant in
empirical models of trust. Otherwise, the voluntary association
theories would appear suspect. Furthermore, given the diversity of
religious denominations in the United States, one might also expect
that the impact of participation in a religious network on individual
trust would vary across denominations along the lines of Community
Theory. Herein lies a dilemma for studying the link between religion
and trust: theoretically there are two channels through which
participation in a religion may affect trust. On the one hand, voluntary
association theory would have that the frequency of participation in a
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religion-based network leads to an increase in trust. Community
Theory, on the other hand, allows for different approaches to
practicing one's faith and for those approaches to exert differential
effects on individual trust. In other words, the religious denomination
and its various customs, messages, and traditions are an important
determinant of trust.

Outcomes of Religious Participation
According to Wuthnow (2002), religious participation has long
been considered important as a “social resource,” being a source of
interpersonal networks and interaction, and has been shown to be an
important determinant of other types of civic involvement. Smidt
(1999) claims that religious life serves as an important contributor to
civil society, and, more specifically, that religious beliefs may shape
the ways in which individuals view human nature and the extent to
which members of one religious community relate to those inside and
outside of the community.
Along this line of reasoning, Coreno (2002: 337) argues that
“… fundamentalists often form small interconnected independent
denominations in the hope of protecting a quarantined traditionalist
culture inside a network of church-based institutions. They nourish
these enclave communities by separating themselves as much as
possible from mainline churches in particular and secular culture in
general.” (See similar arguments by Ammerman (1998), Marsden
(1991), and Tamney (1992).) Smith (1986) adds that southern
fundamentalist denominations, in particular, support a stronger sense
of this separatism attitude.
In the same literature, it is argued that moderate and liberal
Protestants, in contrast, are less threatened by secular society and
tend to thrive more in a modern world. They are also less concerned
with biblical inerrancy and tend to treat religious beliefs as more
personal and private. Further, moderate or mainline denominations
tend to relate more inclusively with other denominations and engage
more in ecumenical activities.
In regard to Catholics, Putnam (1993) argues that the
hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy hinders
cooperation and trust. Smidt (1999), however, in a comparison of the
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United States and Canada, finds that within the United States,
Catholics tend to be more trusting of others than evangelical
Protestants and less trusting than mainline Protestants, but Catholics
ranked significantly lower than members of Protestant denominations
in terms of civic engagement. Welch et al. (2004), in contrast, argue
that, at least since Vatican II, there is no reason to expect that
Catholics would trust any less than mainstream Protestants. They
claim that the American Catholic Church is substantially different from
the Church in Italy, and that most US Catholic parishes do not
maintain a rigid boundary against the outside culture. Based on this
literature we expect that Catholics would fall somewhere between
fundamentalist Protestants and moderate Protestants in terms of social
trust and do not expect a priori any difference between pre-Vatican II
Catholics and post-Vatican II Catholics.
Hence, a thorough study of the impact of religion in individual
trust must allow for: (1) affiliation effects; (2) participation effects;
and (3) the interaction between affiliation and participation. We argue,
therefore, that the differing approaches of Pentecostal, fundamentalist,
moderate, and liberal Protestant denominations will be reflected in
differing attitudes of trust among Protestant members. More
specifically, we hypothesize that Pentecostal and fundamentalist
denominations are thick-tie networks (along the lines of Granovetter
(1983)) or bonding networks (Putnam 2000) that generate “thick
trust” or strong in-group trust at the expense of “thin trust,” or trust
towards “others” outside of the fundamentalist enclave. Liberal
Protestant denominations, in contrast, are weak-tie or bridging
networks that generate relatively more outward trust. Hence,
members of fundamentalist denominations are less likely to trust
others than the non-affiliated and members of liberal denominations.
In an empirical study, the foregoing argument implies that
aggregating Protestant denominations together in a single category
(as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)), might result in the differing
trust attitudes offsetting each other, leading to an incorrect conclusion
that “religion” is a statistically insignificant determinant of individual
trust. Yet, when considering sub groupings of individuals, one must
ensure that the sample size of each subgroup is sufficient to yield a
reasonable estimate of the “average” attitude of the subgroup. Our
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use of the GSS data while disaggregating the Protestant family of
denominations addresses these concerns.

Data and Model
The previous sections motivate the following three testable
hypotheses:
1. Members of conservative Protestant denominations are less
likely to trust others, compared with the base group of
individuals who do not claim a preference for a religious
denomination.
2. Religious participation, in general and independent of affiliation,
leads to greater trust of others.
3. Based on the claims of Putnam (2000) we should find, in
addition, a statistically significant decline in trust over time.
However, we have no expectations regarding whether the
contribution of the various Protestant denominations and
participation, in general, has been stable over time or has also
evolved.

Data
Our data source is the General Social Survey (GSS) spanning
the years 1975 through 2000. It is important to note that, because
respondents to the GSS are different in each survey, this is pooled
cross-sectional data, not panel data. Nonetheless, the time aspect of
the data gives an interesting dimension to examine. That is, is there a
general decline in trust as suggested by others, and are the
contributions of various religious denominations and by religious
attendance (in general) stable over time? Table 1 summarizes all of
the variables and provides all of the specific years included in the
empirical model. The dependent variable of the primary regression
model is the response to the question: “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in
dealing with people?” Possible responses are; “most people can be
trusted,” “can't be too careful,” “depends,” “don't know,” and “no
answer.” Because of the limited nature of the dependent variable, we
follow Alesina and La Ferrara and code this as a binary model with
unity assigned to the first category and zero to the remaining
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categories except for no-answer responses which are treated as
missing observations.
Table 1:

Summary Statistics

Variable

Observations

Mean/
proportion

SD

Minimum

Maximum
1
89
1
1
1
1
1
8

Trust
Age
Married
Female
African American
Education <12
Education >16
Children

24,615
31,309
31,400
31,408
31,408
31,312
31,312
31,298

0.3878
45.2438
53.95%
56.80%
13.25%
24.00%
9.24%
1.9288

0.4873
17.5684
0.4984
0.4954
0.3390
0.4271
0.2895
1.7881

0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0

Log Real income
Full-time
Part-time
Divorced/separated
Happy
Attendance1

28,354
31,405
31,405
31,400
31,113
30,924

2.3065
50.20%
10.42%
15.76%
2.2030
22.0776

0.0802
0.5000
0.3055
0.3644
0.6275
23.0224

1.83
0
0
0
1
0

2.43
1
1
1
3
60

Source: General Social Survey, 1975–2000. Total of 31,408 observations. Specific
years are: 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Nine Census divisions are also included. Go
to http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf for a map of the regions and
divisions.
1Attendance is annualized following Putnam (2000: 424): never=0, less than once a
year=0.5, once a year=l, several times a year=6, once a month=12, 2–3 times a
month=30, nearly every week=40, every week=52, more than once a week=60.

lndependent variables include demographic variables reflecting
individual characteristics such as age and age squared (to allow for a
non-linear effect of age), the number of children the respondent has,
dummy variables for married, divorced or separated, female, African
American, education of 12 years or less and education of 16 years or
more, part-time employment and full-time employment.2 The log of
the level of real income is also included as is the individual's response
to a question on their general level of happiness.3 The happiness
variable (Happy) is coded as 3 for the response of “very happy,” 2 for
“pretty happy,” and 1 for “not too happy.”
The individual's response to the question “what is your religious
preference?” is included, beginning with the major denominations of
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Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religions. The base group,
therefore, is individuals who did not report a preference for a specific
denomination. The individual's reported attendance of religious
services is also included. This variable measures the individual's
reported frequency of attending religious services and ranges from
“never” to “several times a week.” Note that individuals who do not
report a preferred religion may still report that they attend religious
services (even if only attending at holidays, weddings and baptisms).
A description of the attendance variable and statistics on the mean
frequency of attendance across denominations is provided in Table 2.
Table 2:

Denominations and Attendance1

Denomination

Proportion of total N = 31,408

Mean attendance

60.91%
10.86%
23.15%
2.59%
20.55%
13.80%
12.66%
24.70%
1.99%

24.39
28.16
27.85
34.18
27.04
20.30
19.21
25.08
10.04

23.1727
21.9273
24.4467
25.1886
24.2352
22.0654
21.1686
22.9662
16.0325

2.26%
9.87%

18.09
3.47

22.3982
11.4589

Protestant
Black Protestant
Fundamentalist
Pentecostal
Fundamentalist2
Moderate
Liberal
Catholic
Jewish
Other religion
No preference

SD

Notes: 1Attendance is annualized following Putnam (2000: 424): never=0, less than
once a year=0.5, once a year=1, several times a year=6, once a month=12, 2–3
times a month=30, nearly every week=40, every week=52, more than once a
week=60.
2Fundamentalist with Pentecostals removed.
See Table 1 for summary statistics on the attendance variable.

Empirical Model
The data described above represent our base model which we
first compare with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002). Because of the
limited nature of the dependent variable, a probit model is employed.
All specifications of the empirical model include controls for the nine
Census divisions and the year of the survey. The
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used for robust
standard errors and the clustering of respondents in metropolitan
areas is controlled for using the size of the SMA. Listwise deletion is
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used for missing observations resulting in a different number of usable
observations for each regression model. Reported coefficients are the
maximum-likelihood estimates of the marginal effects calculated at the
mean. Hence, the coefficients reflect the change in the probability
given an infinitesimal change in the mean value of the independent
variable. For dummy variables the marginal change is the discrete
change from zero to unity. All p-values referenced in the text are for
two-tailed tests unless otherwise noted.

Results
Model 1 in Table 3, reports results for the base model, which is
provided for comparison purposes with the studies referenced earlier.
The results indicate that trust rises with age, income, education, for
those who work part-time, and for individuals who describe
themselves as happy. Age squared indicates that the age effect is
diminishing with increasing years of age with the maximum effect
occurring at approximately age 66. In contrast, married individuals
and individuals who are divorced or separated, females, African
Americans, and individuals with 12 years or less of education are less
likely to trust others (relative to their respective base groups). None of
the religious denominations are individually significant. However, a
test of the joint significance of the denomination variables, not
examined in either Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) or Welch et al.
(2004), yields a chi-square statistic of 9.47 (which is significant at the
5 percent level), so we may reject the hypothesis of no joint
significance and the hypothesis of no difference among denominations.
This motivates further investigation of the individual and joint
significance of various sub-denominations.
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Table 3:

Model Results

Dependent variable is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” Robust standard errors
are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests. All models include
year and census division controls and these results are available upon request.

Attendance and Sub-denominations
As explained earlier, attendance may, in and of itself, have an
important effect as the extent of past interaction and expected future
interaction in community networks may generate bridging trust, even
if the individual is not committed to a particular tradition. In addition,
various Protestant denominations or traditions may well have
differential effects on their members. If either or both of the effects
are indeed important, then the results in Model 1 suffer from omitted
variable bias. Attendance is therefore added to Model 1 and the results
are provided in Model 2 of Table 3. The results show that attendance is
positive and significant at the 1 percent level.4 Including this variable
also causes: (1) Catholic to become statistically significantly negative
(p-value of 7 percent) and (2) the chi-square statistic of joint
significance of the four denominations to rise to 10.22 (p-value of 3.69
percent).
The GSS data also includes a variable that sorts Protestant
denominations in conservative, moderate, and liberal families based on
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research conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (see
Smith 1986, 1990). Model 3 of Table 3 introduces dummy variables to
separate and control for fundamentalist, moderate and liberal
traditions. In addition, we follow Coreno (2002) and Welch et al., who
argue for a separate classification for Black Protestant denominations
because of the unique historical experience of black denominations,
coding all African Americans who claim a preference for a Protestant
denomination in a separate variable. Note that this variable is slightly
different from an interaction term between African American and
Protestant, as African American Protestants are removed from the
other Protestant categories to differentiate between black Protestant
and white Protestant.
The results of Model 3 indicate that black Protestants and
members of fundamentalist and Catholic traditions are less likely to
trust others—relative to the base group of individuals who do not claim
a preference for a particular denomination—while liberal Protestant
traditions are more likely to trust others.5 Members of moderate
Protestant traditions are not statistically significantly different from the
base group. In addition, the chi-square statistic on the joint
significance of the denomination variables rises to 150.23 and both the
null hypothesis of all the coefficients on the denominations being
simultaneously zero.
Welch et al.(2004) contend, and this is arguably the most
important contribution of their work, that Pentecostal conservative
Protestant traditions are distinct from other Protestant groupings as
they establish the strongest social barriers and are therefore more
likely to have a strong negative effect on social trust. If Pentecostal
members are included in the fundamentalist group, as in Model 3, it
may well be the source of the negative and significant effect. In Model
4, Pentecostals are separated from the other Protestant traditions. To
do so, we use the denomination profiles of The Association of Religion
Data Archives (http://www.thearda.com) at Pennsylvania State
University to further sort the GSS data into Pentecostal families.
Appendix 1 provides the denominations that are included in the
Pentecostal variable.
The results of Model 4 show that the Pentecostal variable is
indeed negative and statistically significant. Further, the inclusion of
the additional classification had little impact on the sign and
Review of Social Economy, Vol 68, No. 2 (June 2010): pg. 163-186. DOI. This article is © Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Routledge: Taylor & Francis
Group does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group.

14

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

significance of the other denominations—except for a slight
improvement in the p-value for Catholics—and little impact on the chisquare statistic of joint significance. As reported earlier, Welch et al.
(2004) assert that Pentecostals are distinct from other Protestants
because of an additional “individualizing” effect. Model 4, indeed,
indicates a larger marginal effect for Pentecostals (in absolute value)
than other denominations. Further hypotheses tests show no statistical
difference between black Protestants and Pentecostals. The differences
between Pentecostals and fundamentalists and Pentecostals and
Catholics, however, are statistically significant (p-values of 7.0 percent
and 3.8 respectively) as is the difference between fundamentalist and
Catholic (p-value of 4.2 percent).
We simulate the change in the probability that an individual
chooses that “most people can be trusted” under various scenarios
using Clarify (Tomz et al. 2001; King et al. 2000) to better
communicate the contribution of the different denominations to trust.
The process followed was to estimate Model 4 of Table 3 and draw
1,000 sets of simulated parameters of the model. Values are then
chosen for the explanatory variables to represent a baseline individual.
Based on means and most frequent occurrences (see Tables 1 and 2),
the baseline individual is the mean value for age, number of children,
income, happiness, and attendance. The individual is also married,
female, and white, works full time, has between 12 and 16 years of
education, and lives in Census division 5. The midpoint of the sample
period, 1988, was selected as the year and initially the individual has
no preference for a particular religious denomination. Next, the
probability that the baseline individual believes “most people can be
trusted” is simulated.
To show the impact of various denominations on trust, the
denomination of the baseline individual is changed to a specific
denomination and the probability that the individual believes “most
people can be trusted” is simulated again. (One important note is that,
for black Protestant, the individual is still coded as white. Otherwise,
the simulation would reflect both being African American and
belonging to a black protestant denomination.) Figure 1 illustrates the
difference in the probability that the individual of a particular
denomination believes “most people can be trusted” from the
probability of the baseline individual. As seen in Figure 1, being a
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member of a liberal Protestant denomination increases the probability
that an individual trusts others while being a Catholic or member of
fundamentalist, Pentecostal, or black Protestant denomination reduces
the probability that an individual trusts others. (Recall that moderate
Protestant was not statistically significantly different from those
individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular
denomination.) The figure also clearly shows the differential effect on
trust of the denominations, with Pentecostal and black Protestant
reducing by the most the probability that an individual trusts others.
Figure 1 Contribution of Denominations to Trust

Models 2, 3, and 4, therefore, confirm our initial hypotheses, that
members of conservative (Pentecostal and fundamentalist) Protestant
denominations trust others less, members of liberal Protestant
denominations trust others more, and participation, in general, leads
to greater trust of others.6

Interaction Effects
The importance of the interaction effects is to determine if
greater immersion in a particular denomination and, therefore, greater
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interaction with members of the denomination reinforces the
denomination effect or moderates the denomination effect. Table 4
provides the interaction of attendance with the various subdenomination categories of Model 4 in Table 3. Note that after
attendance has been interacted with all sub-denomination groupings,
the coefficient of attendance itself reflects the impact of attendance on
those individuals who do not have a preference for any particular
denomination. Recall that an individual might not claim a preference
for any particular denomination yet may or may not attend religious
services. The coefficient on attendance is statistically insignificant,
indicating that increased attendance does not affect the group of
individuals who do not claim an affiliation.
Table 4:

Interaction Effects

Dependent variable is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” Robust standard errors
are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests. Model includes
year and census division controls whose results are available upon request.

The interaction terms are also insignificant for black Protestants,
Pentecostals, fundamentalists, Catholics, Jewish, and other religions.
For these denominations, therefore, the impact of religion occurs
through the denomination effect and the level of attendance does not
appear to either reinforce or moderate the denomination effect. In
contrast, the interaction terms are positive and significant for both
moderate and liberal Protestant denominations. Recall from Table 3
that moderate Protestant was not statistically significantly different
from individuals with no denominational preference. Hence, the impact
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on moderate Protestants is through attendance only. The interaction
for liberal Protestants indicates that greater attendance reinforces the
positive impact of affiliation on trust, and for this group, there exists
both a denomination and attendance effect.

Time Dimensions
The GSS data allow us to consider potential changes in trust in
general, and changes in the contribution of affiliation and attendance
over time. To begin, we follow Guiso et al. (2003), and test for a
Vatican II effect on Catholics by creating a dummy variable for those
individuals born after 1962. This variable is then interacted with the
Catholic variable and both variables are included in Model 4. The
interaction term is statistically insignificant providing no evidence of a
Vatican II effect an Catholics' trust of others.
Putnam (2000) claims there is evidence of a downward trend in
social trust since the 1960s. Costa and Kahn (2003), however, find the
evidence of a trend in social capital mixed. To investigate a trend in
our variable on social trust, we drop the controls for individual years
and include a time trend and its square instead. We do not include
these results in Table 3, and simply report that the trend was negative
and significant at the 1 percent level, but the non-linear term was not
significant. Furthermore, though there was no impact on the sign or
significance of any of the model variables, there was a slight drop in
the pseudo R2.
The time trend was next interacted with each of the
denomination groups in Model 4. The only interaction term that was
significant was Jewish, which was positive and significant with a pvalue of 7 percent. The time trend alone, which in this model captures
the impact of time on individuals who did not have a preference for a
given denomination, remained negative and statistically significant.
Hence, the contribution of the various denominational groupings in
Model 4, other than Jewish, to trust appears to be robust over time in
a statistical sense.
Finally, the time trend was interacted with attendance to
examine if the impact of attendance, in general, has changed over
time. Because of the nature of this variable, two dummy variables
were created, one for relatively high attendance and one for relatively
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low attendance, leaving as the base group those individuals who never
attend religious services. The high-attendance dummy included
individuals that attend religious services at least once a week or more
and the low-attendance dummy included individuals that attended at
least once a year but less than once a week or more. The highattendance and low-attendance variables were positive and significant,
but their interactions with the time variable were not. Hence, the
impact of attendance appears to be robust over time as well.7 (All of
the results regarding the time trend and its interaction are available
upon request.)
This leaves us to consider further Putnam's (2000) claim that
trends in religious practices and participation tend to reinforce the
decline in social trust rather than counterbalance that trend. He makes
his point explicit (p. 78) that it is the arguable decline in overall
participation and the shifting of membership out of more moderate
and liberal denominations toward more conservative evangelical
denominations that renders religion in the United States as “less
effective now as a foundation for civic engagement and bridging social
capital.” Although the results given here do not prove this claim, they
do imply that the contribution of overall religious participation and the
different effects of individual denominations to social trust are stable
over time. We suggest that if religion is indeed less effective in
generating social trust, it might be due to declining participation and a
shift from liberal protestant denominations to fundamentalist and
Pentecostal denominations and merits further investigation.

Conclusion
Recently there has been a renewed interest in the relationship
between religion, social trust, and economic outcomes. This interest is
likely motivated by two factors; the persistent and high rate of
religious participation in the United States relative to most other
advanced economies and, that religious participation arguably remains
the most important form of voluntary participation in the United
States. Although recent literature has provided compelling theoretical
arguments for a relationship between social trust and religion, recent
empirical yield mixed evidence. In particular, cross-country studies
such as Guiso et al. (2003) and Barro and McCleary (2003) find an
association between religious participation and trust, while studies on
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the United States such as Welch et al. (2004) and Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002) find mixed or no evidence to support an association.
In this paper we use GSS data spanning 25 years to test the
relationship between trust and religious participation and affiliation.
We hypothesize that greater frequency of participation in a religious
network leads to an increased trust of others, while affiliation, in
contrast, may have differential effects. Empirical results show that
Pentecostals, fundamentalists, black Protestants, and Catholics are
less likely to trust others, while members of liberal denominations are
more likely to trust others. Hence, the trust attitudes of members of
conservative and black Protestant denominations stand in stark
contrast to those of moderate and liberal denominations. In addition,
while controlling for the denomination effect, trust is increasing with
the frequency that the individual attends religious services. Interaction
of attendance and denomination, however, indicates frequency of
attendance is not significant for black Protestants, Pentecostals,
fundamentalists, Catholics, Jewish, and other religions. The interaction
term is significant and positive for Moderate and Liberal Protestants.
In general, we find that religion does indeed play an important
role in the formation of social trust. In addition, there are statistically
significant differences among denominations and significant
attendance effects. In addition, as suggested by Putnam (2000) and
others, social trust in general has changed over time. Consequently,
studies which aggregate sub- denominations to the majordenomination level and that omit attendance mask important affiliation
effects of religion and overlook participation effects and studies that
focus only on a single year of data may not truly reflect the
contribution of religion to social trust. Recently there has been
evidence of increase switching by individuals in the United States
among various denominations. Survey measures of this phenomenon
and its impact on general trust of others, currently not available in the
GSS, would be an important new direction for future research.
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Appendix 1: Denominations in the GSS Reclassified as
Pentecostal1

1See

The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) at
http://www.thearda.com/Denoms/Families/F_94.asp

Notes
Although Welch et al. do not provide the size of their various groupings of
Protestant denominations, we are able to estimate their size using the
appendix to the paper. It appears that some of the groups, fundamentalist
Protestants for example, approach 30 individuals in number. Other groupings,
of course, are much larger and provide reliable estimates for the year of their
study.
1

It was not possible to accurately code other ethnic groups, such as Hispanics,
in this data set.
2

Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) include the response to a question as to
whether the individual has experienced a trauma in the past year. This
question, however, was not asked over several years of the GSS survey,
resulting in a greatly reduced sample size.
3

Smidt (1999) claims that the relationship between social trust and
attendance is curvilineary, as those who attend the least and those who
attend the most as being less trusting. We included in our regressions: (1)
the square of attendance, and (2) dummied in each category of positive
attendance, yet found no evidence of a non-linear relationship.
4

As an alternative to the coding of “black Protestant” described above, we
also coded black Protestant as the three historically black denominations of
National Baptist Convention in the USA, African Methodist Episcopal, and
African Methodist Episcopal Zion. The only change in our results was that
5
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“black Protestant” was negative and statistically insignificant. This new
grouping, however, had significantly fewer observations (266 versus 3,410 in
the original variable).
We also experimented with two additional dependent variables, “Do you
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or
would they try to be fair?” and “Would you say that most of the time people
try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?”
and a single variable that combined the three different questions on trust,
fairness, and helpfulness together. The variable on fairness and the combined
variable generated similar results as those presented here while the variable
on helpfulness tended to show the religious participation variable as less
statistically significant.
6

An important difference between the work here and that of Welch et al.
(2004) is that Welch et al., use a single year, 2000, of National Election
Survey data. One could hypothesize that an election cycle might well have an
impact on individual trust. Hetherington (2005) shows that there has been a
general decline in the public's trust of government, while Geer (2006)
presents evidence that negative campaigning during an election cycle has a
slight positive effect, if any at all, on trust of the government. We do not
know of any systematic study of the impact of an election cycle on trust of
other individuals. In Model 4 we dropped the year dummy and added a time
trend and a dummy for presidential election years. The trend is negative and
significant while the election dummy is positive and significant. This issue
may be worthy of additional research.
7
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